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According to their critics, the 1994 Amendments to Florida's
Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act (1994 Amendments)' make radical
and unprecedented changes to state tort law and unfairly tilt the judicial
system against third-party defendants responsible for state Medicaid
expenditures. In a companion commentary published with this one,
Professor Van Alstyne rolls out the heavy theoretical artillery of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to
attack the Florida statute.' Other charges have been widely circulated
as part of a well-financed public relations campaign against the Florida
law by the tobacco industry, whose interest in the matter stems from the

* A.B., 1985, Harvard College; J.D., 1988, Harvard Law School. Mr. Massey, a former
law clerk to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., is a sole practitioner in Washington, D.C., who is
advising-free of charge-the States of Florida and Mississippi in their lawsuits against cigarette
companies.
1. 1994 Fla. Laws ch. 94-251 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 16.59, 409.907, .910, .913, .920
(Supp. 1994)).
2. William W. Van Alstyne, Denying Due Processin the FloridaCourts:A Commentary
on the 1994 Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act of Florida,46 FLA. L. REv. 563 (1994).
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fact that it is currently subject to suit under the 1994 Amendments in an
action filed in Palm Beach County.3
This commentary demonstrates that the 1994 Amendments are hardly
the sweeping revolution in traditional tort law that their opponents
claim. Rather, the Amendments incorporate familiar legal and equitable
principles to correct the currently unfair situation in which Florida
businesses and taxpayers are forced to pay hundreds of millions of
dollars annually for smoking-related illnesses-a sum which rightfully
should be borne by the tobacco industry itself. The Amendments clarify
that the State, through the Florida Agency for Health Care
Administration, has "a cause of action against a liable third party to
recover the full amount of medical assistance provided by Medicaid, and
such cause of action is independent of any rights or causes of action of
the recipient."4
The Amendments simply streamline the process by which the State
can hold responsible third parties accountable for the costs they impose
on the taxpayers. The Amendments do not change the standards of
primary conduct to which tobacco companies and others are subject. Nor
do they eliminate the State's burden to prove, through relevant and
probative evidence in court, that (a) cigarettes are defective, negligently
manufactured, unreasonably dangerous, or otherwise tortious; (b)
cigarettes have devastating health effects in Florida; and (c) these health
effects translate into increased Medicaid costs for the State.
Since the 1970s, the State has had the statutory authority to sue
responsible third parties to recover Medicaid costs for which they are
attributable. The 1994 Amendments do not represent a fundamental
change in this regard. In fact, they parallel a federal statute that has long
given the federal government an independent statutory right to recover
medical assistance costs from responsible third parties. 5
Not surprisingly, a Florida circuit court recently rejected the tobacco
industry's arguments that the 1994 Amendments violate the defendants'
right to due process or their right of access to the courts, although the
court did hold that the Amendments could not be applied retroactively
and could not vary certain procedural rules that are under the exclusive
3. Florida v. American Tobacco Co., Civ. No. 95-1466AO (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. filed Feb.
21, 1995). American Tobacco Co. has been stayed pending the outcome of Florida v. Associated
Indus. of Fla., Inc., No. 86,213 (Fla. filed Aug. 17, 1995). American Tobacco Co. (Civ. No. 951466AO) (order granting stay). Although by their terms the 1994 Amendments apply to all
parties responsible for Medicaid expenditures, the Governor has issued an executive order and
has executed and filed a stipulation which essentially limits the use of the Amendments to the
tobacco industry.
4. FLA. STAT. § 409.410(6)(a) (Supp. 1994).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1988).
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control of the judiciary.6 The matter will no doubt ultimately be
resolved by the Florida Supreme Court.7 But there is every reason to
believe that the State's highest court will see through the fairy tale
objections to the 1994 Amendments and identify the tobacco industry's
arguments for what they are: a lot of smoke.
I. FLORIDA LAW PRIOR TO THE 1994 AMENDMENTS
Before examining the history of Florida's statutory authority to sue
responsible third parties, it is useful to analyze Florida's pre-existing
common law power to hold third parties accountable for costs they
impose on the State. Longstanding equitable principles permit states to
assert independent claims against tortfeasors responsible for Medicaid
expenditures, without any need to show that individual victims, such as
smokers, would succeed in direct suits for damages against the
tortfeasors. These equitable causes of action are not derivative, and
therefore the states would not be limited to the rights and remedies of
individual victims, nor be subject to any affirmative defenses that
tortfeasors might assert against those victims.
A. A State's Common Law Authority to Hold Responsible Third
PartiesAccountable for the Costs They Impose on the State
The ability of states, under principles of equity and without any
specific statutory authority, to hold third parties accountable for their
fair share of Medicaid and other expenses is currently a matter of
litigation. Most notably, the State of Mississippi has brought suit in
Mississippi chancery court against a group of tobacco companies under
equitable theories of unjust enrichment, restitution, indemnity, and
public nuisance.8 On February 21, 1995, the chancery court held that
the motions of the defendant companies to dismiss Mississippi's
complaint for failure to state a claim were "not well taken." 9
The chancery court's decision reflects longstanding equitable
principles that permit states to recover Medicaid costs that should
rightfully be borne by responsible third parties. The salient relationship
is trilateral in nature, not bilateral. A tobacco company sells cigarettes
6. See Final Order and Declaratory Judgment, Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc. v. Florida,
No. 94-3128 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. June 26, 1995), appeal docketed No. 86,213 (Fla. Aug. 17, 1995)
(oral arguments scheduled for Nov. 7,1995).
7. By order of Aug. 17, 1995, the Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and
ordered expedited briefing. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc. v. Florida, No. 86,213 (Fla. Sup. Ct.).
8. Mississippi v. The American Tobacco Co., No. 94:1429 (Ch. Jackson County, Miss.).
9. Id. (Order of Feb. 21, 1995, denying defendant's motion to dismiss).
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to a smoker; the smoker predictably becomes ill; and the State is called
upon to pay a portion, or even all, of the smoker's medical costs. This
situation does not involve only tobacco companies and smokers. Here,
an innocent third party-the State, together with all those it
represents-has been forced to pay enormous sums which should in
equity have been borne by the tortfeasors. States are not participants in
the enterprise that has caused them, collectively, to incur billions of
dollars in healthcare costs. They have instead been compelled unfairly
to subsidize the externalities of tobacco companies' activities, to the
great detriment of state taxpayers, citizens, and businesses. As between
tobacco companies and the State, the former should bear the cost of the
injuries attributable to their tortious activities.
Several equitable theories are available to states to assert independent
and separate claims in their own right.
1. Restitution/Unjust Enrichment
Under the principles of restitution and unjust enrichment, "[a] person
who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to
make restitution to the other."'" The concept of "conferred benefit" is
construed broadly:
A person confers a benefit upon another if he ...satisfies
a debt or a duty of the other, or in any way adds to the
other's security or advantage. He confers a benefit not only
where he adds to the property of another, but also where he
saves the other from expense or loss. The word "benefit,"
therefore, denotes any form of advantage."
It is not difficult to see how states could make out claims for
restitution of monies expended for the medical care of the indigent
victims of tobacco products. Tobacco companies, through the
production, promotion, and sale of their products, have knowingly
created a massive public health crisis. The State, as guardian of the
public health, has acted to meet this crisis through the provision of
necessary medical treatment. Indeed, once it has entered the federal
Medicaid program, a State is obligated to treat all indigents on a
nondiscriminatory basis.' In fulfilling its duty, the State has assumed
a crushing financial burden-a burden which in all equity and fairness
10.

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1

(1936).

11. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1,cmt. b (1936) (emphasis added).
12. West v. Cole, 390 F. Supp. 91, 97 (N.D. Miss. 1975). "[O]nce a state opts for the
Medicaid program ... it becomes bound by all federal regulations and standards, including
federal eligibility requirements." Id.
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should be borne by those whose lucrative enterprise is responsible for
the harm.
Moreover, the State has demonstrably enriched tobacco companies.
It has relieved them of the possibility of immense liability and litigation
expenses from thousands of individual suits for medical expenses by the
victims of smoking. More fundamentally, the nature of a defendant's
duty met by a plaintiff seeking restitution need not be such as would
give rise to legal liability. 3 Thus, even accepting, arguendo, that
tobacco companies could not have been held legally liable for the
medical expenses of individual smokers, the companies still would be
liable to the State for the sums it has expended in meeting their
"manifest" responsibilities to the victims of their enterprise. The
Restatement of Restitution section 115, often referred to as the
''emergency assistance doctrine," provides for such relief under precisely
these circumstances:
A person who has performed the duty of another by
supplying things or services, although acting without the
other's knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution from
the other if
(a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge
therefor, and
(b) the things or services supplied were immediately
necessary to satisfy the requirements of public
decency, health, or safety. 4
Such liability would not be dependent on the State showing that
individual smokers could recover from tobacco companies under

13. See, e.g., United States v. Consolidated Edison Co., 580 F.2d 1122, 1127-28 (2d Cir.
1978) (holding that defendant "had, if not an absolute, at least a manifest, duty to provide its
customers with electricity.... Distinguishing its general duty to provide service from an
absolute legal duty to pay damages to individual customers... would be hypertechnical and
would ignore Con Edison's overriding responsibilities to the public"); Peninsular & Oriental
Steam Navigation Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc., 553 F.2d 830, 835 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 859 (1977) (finding that a ship coming to aid of sick crewman of another ship was
entitled to restitution for costs, even though sick crewman's own ship did not have an absolute
duty to provide the sailor with medical attention, it had a "manifest duty" to do so); City of
Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 90-7064, 1992 WL 98482, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 1992)
(rejecting argument that defendants must have a specific legal duty to abate lead paint hazard
in order for plaintiff to recover costs of such abatement); City of New York v. Keene Corp., 505
N.Y.S.2d 782, 787 (Sup. Ct. 1986), aft'd, 513 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (allowing
claims in restitution and indemnity for asbestos removal even though future injuries were purely
hopothetical: "Since ... the ultimate responsibility is on the manufacturer, in equity the
manufacturer has the duty to remove asbestos if proven hazardous").
14. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITrUTION § 115 (1936).
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products liability theories. Indeed, restitution is not a fault-based
doctrine at all.
[I]t is not essential, in order to create the obligation to make
restitution for benefits, that the recipient should himself
have been guilty of any tortious conduct or fault. Moreover,
incapacity

...

to incur liability in tort is not in itself a

defense to an action for restitution....
' since restitution does not depend upon the existence
of a wrong. ... "

2. Indemnity
States also could recover their expenses under the equitable doctrine
of indemnity. This concept should be distinguished from contribution or
indemnity among joint tortfeasors. Equitable indemnity is instead a
cost-shifting doctrine governed by the basic principle that
[a] person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty
which is owed by him but which as between himself and
another should have been discharged by the other, is
entitled to indemnity from the other, unless the payor is
barred by the wrongful nature of his conduct. 6
The doctrine "rests upon the proposition that when one is compelled to
pay money which in justice another ought to pay, the former may
recover of the latter the sum so paid, unless the one making the payment
is barred by the wrongful nature of his conduct."' 7 In the words of the

15. 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 4 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
16. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 76 (1936).
17. 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indemnity § 2 n.13 (1968). As another commentator stated:
[The right of indemnity is essentially equitable in nature, with principles of equity
furnishing a more satisfactory basis for indemnity; thus, an award of indemnity
should follow traditional concepts of equity. Indemnification is a flexible, equitable
remedy designed to accomplish a fair allocation of loss among parties, based on
the legal concepts of restitution and unjust enrichment, with the prevention of
unjust enrichment as its underpinning.
As an equitable remedy, indemnity does not lend itself to hard and fast rules,
and, its application must turn on the facts of each case. The right to indemnity
stands upon the principle that everyone is responsible for the consequences of his
own acts, and arises among parties exposed to liability by the action of another
who, in equity or law, should make good the other's loss.
42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 3 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
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Florida Supreme Court, indemnity is "a right which inures to a person
who has discharged a duty which is owed by him but which, as between
himself and another, should have been discharged by the other."' 8 The
court added that "[i]n the case of indemnity the defendant is liable for
the whole outlay." 9
As with restitution and unjust enrichment, a State's equitable
indemnity claim would be an independent, not derivative, cause of
action. It would not depend on tobacco companies' liability in tort to
individual smoking victims. Indeed, a considerable number of courts
have allowed parties in the states' shoes, obliged by law to pay a sum
of money to a victim, to recover the amount in indemnity against a
tortfeasor, even when the original victim could not have recovered
against the tortfeasor.
For example, in Trail Builders Supply Co. v. Reagan," an employee
was injured on the job by a truss roll press operated without a safety
device.2 The exclusivity provision of the Workmen's Compensation
Act barred the employee from suing the employer in tort.22 The
employee, however, recovered against the manufacturer of the machine;
at this point, the manufacturer sued the employer in indemnity to
recover the damages that it might have to pay to the employee.23 Like
the tobacco companies, the employer argued that, since the employee
could not have recovered, the indemnity action was precluded. 4 The
Florida Supreme Court, however, refused to apply the affirmative
defense to the indemnity action, recognizing that the manufacturer's
claim was "direct against [the employer] for an independent act of [the
employer] which may result in damage to [the manufacturer]." 25

18. Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d 703, 705 (Fla. 1977) (citing 41 AM. JUR. 2D
Indemnity § 1) (1968).
19. Id. at 706.
20. 235 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1970).
21. Id. at 482.
22. Id. at 483.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 485. In addition, courts have allowed third-party actions against tortfeasors
who were protected from a first-party suit by interspousal or intrafamilial immunity. E.g., Quest
v. Joseph, 392 So. 2d 256, 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (allowing contribution against
plaintiff-minor's contributorily negligent mother despite the fact that parent-child immunity
would have barred suit between injured minor and mother).
Recognizing the independent nature of indemnity claims, courts have established the general
rule that an indemnity action's statute of limitations does not begin until the payment for which
the party is seeking reimbursement has been made and, therefore, does not depend upon the
viability of the originally injured party's claim. Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, When Statute
of Limitations Commences to Run Against Claim for Contribution or Indemnity Based on Tort,
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Similarly, a State should be able to sue for the independent damage
which it suffered at the hands of tobacco companies.
3. Public Nuisance
In addition, a State could recover in public nuisance. Secion 821B of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts reflects the broad power of the State
to protect the public from activities that are "an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public."26 The
Restatement provides that "[c]ircumstances that may sustain a holding
that an interference with a public right is unreasonable include...
[w]hether the conduct involves a significant interference with the public
health., 27 By abating, through the Medicaid program, a health hazard
that tobacco companies have created but refused to help fix-the largest
health hazard in American history-a State could establish the essence
of a public nuisance claim.2"
To be sure, until Mississippi's groundbreaking lawsuit,29 such
equitable theories were not applied to call the tobacco companies to
account for the staggering health costs which they have inflicted for
years upon our country. But the equitable principles discussed here are
hardly new. Through the manufacturing and distribution of their

57 A.L.R.3D 867, 881-84 (1974) ("[Tlhe generally recognized rule... is that a claim for
indemnity based on tort does not accrue, and the statute of limitations does not start to run
thereon, at the time of the commission of the tort ... or at the time an action is instituted by
the person injured.... The claim accrues at the time the indemnity claimant suffers loss or
damage, that is, at the time of payment of the underlying claim, payment of a judgment thereon,
or payment of a settlement thereof by the party seeking indemnity.") (footnotes omitted).
Similarly, courts have allowed a third-party action despite a first-party affirmative defense
based upon an implied duty running between indemnitor and indemnitee. E.g., Dole v. Dow
Chem. Co., 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 387 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that defendant may sue third
party for indemnity without plaintiff having named third party as responsible).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(l) (1977).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a) (1977).
28. For example, in Town of East Troy v. Soo Line R.R., 653 F.2d 1123, 1131 (7th Cir.
1980), the court allowed a town to recover from a railroad the cost of installing a public well
to remedy a ground water pollution problem, under the theory of public nuisance. In State v.
Schenectady Chems., Inc., 479 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1014 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), the court allowed
the State to recover cost of abatement against companies that had dumped chemical wastes,
observing that "the Attorney-General is clearly authorized [under common law] on behalf of the
State to commence legal proceedings to abate a public nuisance." In United States v. Illinois
R.R., 501 F. Supp. 18, 21 (E.D. Mo. 1980), the court allowed a government agency to pursue
damages based on the expense for removing a bridge deemed a public suisance. Similar in City
of Evansville, Ind. v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979), the court
required defendants to pay for expenses to clean up discharged chemicals.
29. Order of Feb. 21, 1995, Moore ex rel Mississippi v. The American Tobacco Co., No.
94:1429 (Ch., Jackson County, Miss.).
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products, the tobacco companies have endangered a State's most
precious resource: the health of its citizens. It would be quite odd
indeed-and would require a radical evisceration of traditional equitable
principles-if a State were powerless to protect its citizens and
taxpayers from such harm.
B. The History.of Florida'sMedical Assistance Statute
Accordingly, there are powerful reasons to think that Florida has
always had the ability to hold third parties responsible for the medical
care costs the State has incurred as a result of their wrongful conduct.
Such claims would have been governed by traditional equitable
principles. In 1978, however, any doubt was eliminated when the
Florida Legislature gave the State a statutory subrogation right under the
former Medicaid third-party liability provision of the medical assistance
statute. 0 This provision clarified that the State could indeed recover
Medicaid costs from responsible third parties.
The State's action was denominated as a "subrogated" claim, but no
Florida court ever had the opportunity to decide whether the statutory
action was a truly independent one that the State could assert on its own
behalf-like the equitable claims discussed in Part I-A, supra-or
whether the State's subrogation action was limited to the claims of a
Medicaid recipient, and therefore subject to possible affirmative defenses
that could be asserted against her. Although the question is necessarily
an unsettled one, it appears that, even under the original 1978 statute,
the State would have been able to assert "subrogated" claims that were
not subject to the claims and defenses available to an individual
Medicaid recipient.
Courts have distinguished between the contractual subrogation rights
of private insurance companies and the rights of entities that assume
risks by operation of law, without compensation. Hence, in Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County,3 the court distinguished
between "contractual subrogation" and equitable remedies, including
indemnification. If insurance is provided by contract, where a risk is
assumed for a fee or premium, the insurer may be entitled only to be
subrogated to the claims of the insured. The remedy is entirely different,
however, when the "insurer's" obligation is imposed by law or
statute. In American Insurance Co. v. Yellow Cab Co.,33 the court
30. FLA. STAT. § 409.266(3)(b) (Supp. 1978) (repealed 1991). Third-party liability
subsequently was provided in § 409.2665 (Supp. 1990), which in 1991 was renumbered (current
version at § 409.910 (Supp. 1994)).
31. 436 So. 2d 976, 978 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
32. Courts have explained the difference between the contractual right of subrogation
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explained that there was a difference between conventional subrogation
and equitable subrogation: the latter "is based on the policy that no
person should be unjustly enriched by another's loss, and may be
invoked wherever justice demands its application, irrespective of
technical legal rules."34
Medicaid is not a conventional insurance scheme.35 It thus appears
that Florida's statutory cause of action was separate from the claims of
Medicaid recipients and was not subject to any affirmative defenses
which might be asserted by tobacco companies in suits brought by
individual smokers. Indeed, the federal government's own statutory right
to recover medical assistance costs from responsible third parties3 6 is
"an independent right of recovery against the tortfeasor" and "is not
defeated even by certain restrictions that might bar the injured person's
own recovery." 37 The Supreme Court of New Jersey relied upon just
such an analogy to 42 U.S.C. § 2651 to conclude that, under the New
Jersey Medicaid statutes, "[t]he State has two avenues by which it may
seek reimbursement for Medicaid payments: it may either institute an

and the equitable doctrine of implied indemnity:
[S]ince the insurer's obligation to pay is due solely to its contract, it presumably
received consideration for agreeing to bear the risk; allowing indemnity gives the
insurer a windfall. Implied indemnity is not intended for such persons, As a general
rule, "[t]he right to indemnity inures to a person who, without active fault on his
part, is compelled by reason of legal obligation or relationship to pay damages
which have been caused by the acts of another."
Industrial Risk Insurers v. Creole Prod. Servs., 746 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1984) (second
alteration in original) (citation omitted); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. United States, 575 F.2d 1031,
1034-35 (2d Cir. 1978) (explaining that "confusion existed regarding the principle of indemnity
which underlies subrogation with an implied action for indemnification-which is completely
distinguishable" and clarifying that "[t]he insurance carrier's relationship with his insured is not
one imposed by operation of law or statute; it is a contractual relationship in which the carrier
has deliberately accepted a risk for a fee.").
33. 495 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
34. Id. at 206-07.
35. See United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 613 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("mhe
relationship between a hospital receiving reimbursement under Medicaid or Medicare and the
government is not analogous to an insurance contract. Medicare and Medicaid are not funded
by beneficiaries' premium payments, but by a payroll tax. This is not the form of conventional
insurance.").
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1988).
37. Holbrook v. Andersen Corp., 996 F.2d 1339, 1341 (1st Cir. 1993) (citation omitted);
see also Health Ins. Ass'n of Am. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412. 419 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that the
"government's independent right of action entitles it to full recovery even where [the] tort
victim's right would be limited by comparative negligence") (citing United States v. Theriaque,
674 F. Supp. 395 (D. Mass. 1987)).
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action directly against the tortfeasor who is liable for the medical
expenses or seek recovery by way of the Medicaid recipient through a
right of subrogation."3
Although the precise contours of the subrogation right conferred by
the 1978 statute have never been definitively resolved, the Florida
Legislature's intent that the State be authorized to recover the full
amount of Medicaid expenses from responsible third parties is well
illustrated by the Legislature's reaction to Underwood v. Department of
Health & Rehabilitative Services.3 9 In Underwood, the appellate court
held that the State's subrogation claim against monies recovered by the
Medicaid patient was limited by the recipient's own circumstances. 4'
In response, the Legislature created the Medicaid Third-Party Liability
Act,41 providing that the State took title to an injury claim 'free and
clear of latent equities in a third person."'4 2 As the circuit court
observed on remand in the Underwood case, the legislature took this
action in order to clarify its "historic intent ... as to full recovery by
the [S]tate. '43 The court added that by creating the Medicaid ThirdParty Liability Act, "the legislature ratified the Department's
construction of [former law] in that, under the [Medicaid Third-Party
Liability Act], the Department has multiple independent rights of
recovery, which are to be construed together to provide the greatest
recovery to the state from third party resources, without reduction based
on equitable remedies."' The court noted that the 1990 Amendments
expressly state that
it is the intent of the Legislature that Medicaid be repaid in
full and prior to any other person, program or entity....
Principlesof common law and equity as to assignment,lien
and subrogationare to be abrogatedto the extent necessary
to assure full recovery by Medicaid from third party
resources.
By its terms, this language suggests that the legislature meant to cut off
any legal or equitable claim-whether asserted by the recipient, a
creditor, or a responsible third party-that prevented the State from fully
38. Hedgebeth v. Medford, 378 A.2d 226, 228 (N.J. 1977).
39. 551 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
40. Id. at 525-26.
41. Act effective July 3, 1990, 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 90-925, § 33 (codified at FLA.
§ 409.2665 (Supp. 1990)).
42. FLA. STAT. § 409.910(6)(c)(2) (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
43. Underwood v. Fifer, 50 Fla. Supp. 2d 199, 202 (Fla. 10th Cir. Ct. 1991).
44. Id. at 203 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 202 (original emphasis omitted) (new emphasis added).
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recovering its Medicaid expenses. The Underwood case, however,
addressed only the rights of the State vis-d-vis the Medicaid recipient
herself. Because nothing in the appellate court's original decision
purported to declare any limit on the rights of the State in a direct
action against the tortfeasor itself, the circuit court on remand did not
discuss the matter.
The legislative response to Underwood makes clear at the very least
the State's ability to cut off the claims and equities of Medicaid
recipients, their creditors, and others to whom those recipients are
obligated. Thus, the effect of the 1990 Amendments was to work a
dramatic reordering of existing rights and liabilities, upsetting settled
expectations and guaranteeing that the State could always place itself at
the front of the line in recovering whatever monies were available. Yet
the Amendments triggered no public outcry and no repeal campaign. It
is ironic indeed that the 1994 Amendments-which streamlined the
State's remedy as against culpable third parties-should receive greater
criticism than the 1990 Amendments, which involved the State's power
to elbow aside more sympathetic innocent creditors and other claimants.
In any event, prior to 1994, Florida appears to have had common law
equitable claims to recover Medicaid expenses from responsible third
parties. After 1978, it certainly enjoyed a statutory right to pursue such
expenses. Against this background, it is plain that the 1994 Amendments
did not work the revolution in Florida law that their opponents maintain.
II. THE CHANGES MADE BY THE 1994 AMENDMENTS
Throughout the early 1990s, Florida's Medicaid costs rose nearly $1
billion each year, depleting funding for such essential state needs as
education and law enforcement. As part of its response to this problem,
the State made the reasonable judgment that those responsible for
escalating healthcare costs should help pay for them. State officials have
determined that Florida has spent more than $1.3 billion in Medicaid
funds treating indigents with smoking-related diseases since 1989. The
State also estimates that tobacco products are responsible for the deaths
of about 28,000 people in Florida each year.
The 1994 Amendments were therefore adopted in order to streamline
the State's existing statutory remedy against responsible third parties. In
so doing, Florida also was acting to fulfill its obligations under federal
Medicaid law, which requires it to pursue any third party that may be
liable for Medicaid expenses.46
The 1994 Amendments do not alter the rules of primary conduct;

46. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(A) (1988).
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they do not deem "'tortious" or "wrongful" any conduct that was
previously lawful. Indeed, manufacturers have been on notice since 1963
they are subject to absolute liability in Florida for breach of the implied
warranty of fitness.47 Nor can there by any claim of "trial by
legislature" or "presumption of guilt," for the 1994 Amendments no
more eliminate the State's burden to prove its case in court than the
1978 statute did. Because the central thrust of the 1994 Amendments
seems entirely fair, critics have tried to attack it by distorting some of
its specific provisions.
A. The "Elimination" of Affirmative Defenses
The 1994 Amendments provide that the State's cause of action is not
subject to affirmative defenses that tobacco companies might invoke in
actions by individual smokers, such as assumption of the risk or
contributory negligence.48 But a plain reading of the Medicaid ThirdParty Liability Act indicates that it also limited the legal and equitable
claims that might be interposed-if not by culpable third parties, then
at the very least by innocent Medicaid recipients and their creditors.49
More fundamentally, a state legislature is free to create or eliminate
affirmative defenses at its pleasure." It is entirely reasonable that
affirmative defenses should not apply to actions by the State against
tobacco companies, because the State did not assume any of the risks of
smoking. In the trilateral relationship among Florida, cigarette
companies, and smokers, the State is stuck with the medical bill. The
1994 Amendments simply allow the State to proceed in court as the
innocent party that it is.
Indeed, the Florida courts have restricted the defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of the risk, even in litigation between private
parties." Some courts have held that the defenses of assumption of the

47. See Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 173 (Fla. 1963) (holding that
protection of the public health demands the continued recognition and enforcement of an implied
warranty of fitness).
48. See FLA. STAT. § 409.910(1) (Supp. 1994).
49. See FLA. STAT. § 409.2665 (Supp. 1990).
50. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982); Martinez v.
California, 444 U.S. 277, 281-82 (1980).
51. In 1977, for example, the Florida Supreme Court abolished the assumption of the risk
defense, merging it into contributory negligence. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 292 (Fla.
1977). The court observed that the assumption of the risk doctrine "has not only been
indiscriminately misapplied historically but also represents a morally unacceptable social policy
which was calculated to advance the industrial revolution regardless of the cost in human
suffering." Id.
In 1976, the Florida Supreme Court recognized the strict liability theory for defective and
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risk and contributory negligence are inapplicable in suits by cigarette
smokers." The Florida legislature was free to adopt such reasoning in
the context of a suit by the State.
B. "Joinder" of Claims
The 1994 Amendments also permit the State, in certain situations, to
bring a single action to recover all Medicaid sums due from a particular
set of defendants. 3 If the State demonstrates that medical assistance
has been provided by Medicaid to more than one recipient, that the
State's claim with respect to each recipient involves "common issues of
fact or law," and similarly demonstrates that "the number of recipients
for which medical assistance has been provided by Medicaid is so large
as to cause it to be impracticable to join or identify each claim," then
the State "shall not be required to so identify the individual recipients
for which payment has been made, but rather can proceed to seek
recovery based upon payments made on behalf of an entire class of
recipients. 54
Although critics have labelled this provision as dealing with
"joinder" or "class action" issues, that description is inaccurate.5 The
State-not a group of Medicaid recipients-is the plaintiff. The statutory
language merely recognizes that Florida's injury is an aggregate one: the
sum total of its Medicaid expenditures attributable to smoking-related
diseases. The identity of the individual smoking victims is unimportant
to this injury, and there is no reason to require the State to show that
any given Medicaid smoker was part of the excess mortality and
morbidity caused by smoking.
The ability of the State to bring a single action-rather than splitting
up its claim into a series of smaller lawsuits-reflects a basic pleading
prerogative enjoyed by all plaintiffs. 6 However, some critics allege
that, without disclosure of the names of individual Medicaid recipients,
defendants will not be able to mount an adequate defense by, for

unreasonably dangerous products. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 86 (Fla.
1976). The court abrogated, in part, the contributory negligence defense in strict liability cases,
explaining that "contributory negligence of the ... consumer ... in the sense of a failure to
discover a defect, or to guard against the possibility of its existence, is not a defense." Id. at 90
(emphasis added).
52. See, e.g., Wilks v. American Tobacco Co., 61 U.S.L.W. 2708 (Miss. Cir. May 11,
1993).
53. FLA. STAT. § 409.910(9) (Supp. 1994).
54. Id. § 409.910(9), (9)(a).
55. In any event, the statutory requirements parallel those of Florida's joinder and class
action rules. Compare FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a), 1.220(a), (b) with FLA. STAT. § 409.910.
56. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g).
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example, proving that the Medicaid expenditures in question were the
result of fraud or bureaucratic mismanagement rather than the
defendants' wrongful conduct. But the 1994 Amendments merely
provide that the State need not identify the Medicaid recipients as part
of its affirmative case; they are silent about whether the identities can
or should be disclosed (during discovery, for example) on an appropriate
showing by the defendant. Plainly, such matters should be worked out
by courts during litigation. They afford no objection against the law on
its face.
C. Use of Statistical Evidence
The 1994 Amendments also permit the State to use statistical
evidence to prove causation and damages. But the Amendments do not
remove the traditional judicial control over such evidence. The
Amendments do not require a judge to admit fatally flawed statistical
evidence, nor do they compel him or her to find that a particular
quantum of statistical evidence offered by the State is good enough to
prove liability and damages by a preponderance of the evidence. In any
event, statistical evidence is already admissible in court in a wide range
of cases. 8 It is especially reasonable to use statistical evidence in the
tobacco context, where the State's injury is itself an aggregate one.
Indeed, focusing on the population effects of smoking in the
aggregate is a more sensible system that will prove fairer to defendants
overall. 9 Suppose, for example, that it is 75% likely that each victim
of a particular disease contracted her illness from smoking and.that there
are one hundred such victims. If the State proceeds on an aggregate
basis by statistical evidence, it will be able to recover the Medicaid
costs of 75% of the cases involving that disease, or 75 out of each 100
hypothetical cases. But, if the State were to proceed on an individual-byindividual basis, it might well be able to meet the more-probable-thannot standard in every case (since 75% is greater than 50%), and the
State would recover the Medicaid costs of all 100 individuals. Tobacco

57. FLA. STAT. § 410.910(9) (Supp. 1994).
58. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.12 (1993) (allowing probabilities from blood test to
provide paternity); In re Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, 540 So. 2d 825, 829 (Fla.
1989) (including an instruction on mortality tables to estimate life expectancy to prove
damages); Vargas v. State, 640 So. 2d 1139, 1151 (Fla. Ist DCA 1994) (allowing evidence of
DNA match based on statistical probability); City of Riviera Beach v. Florida Dep't of Envtl.
Regulation, 502 So. 2d 1337, 1340 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (referring to epidemiology studies).
59. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
"Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 849, 905-23 (1984).
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companies would be required to pay a greater sum of money to the state
treasury.
D. Market Share Liability
The 1994 Amendments allow the State to proceed under a market
share liability theory, but only upon a showing that cigarettes "are
substantially interchangeable among brands, and that substantially
similar factual or legal issues would be involved in seeking recovery
against each liable third party individually.""' This provision reflects
existing Florida law. In Conley v. Boyle Drug Co.,6 the Florida
Supreme Court adopted the market share theory of liability, applied it
to conduct occurring thirty-five years previously, and specifically
rejected arguments that it was unfair to defendants.62
As with the other provisions of the 1994 Amendments, market share
liability is especially appropriate here in light of the aggregate nature
of the State's injury: because the harm to the State is independent of the
individual identities of Medicaid smokers, it is unnecessary-even if it
were feasible-to determine which brand of cigarettes was smoked by
each Medicaid patient. The critical issue is each manufacturer's
contribution to the total damage done to the State.
Some critics have alleged that the combination of market share and
joint and several liability in the 1994 Amendments means that a
manufacturer responsible for one percent of a class of products in the
State could be held liable for one hundred percent of the Medicaid
expenditures attributable to those products in Florida. Such an argument,
however, simply illustrates the implications of joint and several liability:
a wrongdoer may be held liable for more than its "fair share," and be
forced to recover the excess via a contribution action. In any event, the
hypothetical concern cannot provide the basis for a facial attack on the
1994 Amendments. In the only lawsuit filed under the Amendments, the
State has sued every major tobacco company doing business in
Florida.63
In sum, the 1994 Amendments are hardly the radical step that their
critics claim. Indeed, it is worth comparing them to federal statutes that
have worked much more dramatic changes in the law. In Usery v.
Elkhorn Turner Mining Co.,' for example, the Supreme Court upheld

60. FLA. STAT. § 409.910(9)(b) (Supp. 1994).
61. 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990).
62. Id. at 285-86.
63. Florida v. American Tobacco Co., Civ. No. 95-1466AO (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. filed Feb.
21, 1995).
64. 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
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a federal law requiring coal mine operators to compensate former
employees disabled by black lung disease, even though the operators
had never expected such liability and the employees had long since
ended their connection with the industry.65 In Concrete Pipe &
66
Products of California,Inc. v. ConstructionLaborers Pension Trust,
the Court upheld a multiemployer pension statute that vastly (and
retroactively) increased an employer's pension liabilities far in excess
of what a series of private contracts and labor agreements had
provided. 7
The federal Superfund statute (CERCLA) 6s provides another useful
comparison. CERCLA changed the rules of primary conduct and made
responsible parties liable for clean-up costs even though many hazardous
wastes were not known to be harmful at the time of their disposal (often
decades ago), or were disposed of using the best available techniques. 9
CERCLA imposes strict, joint, and several liability for dangerous
"releases" of hazardous wastes, both retroactively and prospectively.7"
Any business shown to have generated wastes for disposal at a site can
be held liable as a responsible party-without regard to whether the
substance actually caused the harm that necessitated the clean-up.7'
By contrast, the 1994 Amendments do not change the rules of
primary conduct. They preserve the requirement of causation-i.e., that
the State prove the health effects of smoking and quantify the damages
that the State has incurred. They streamline an existing statutory remedy,
incorporating many familiar equitable principles and features of Florida
law. The 1994 Amendments are a far more modest step than many
existing and well-accepted legislative measures.

65. Id. at 6, 12.
66. 113 S. Ct. 2264 (1993).
67. Id. at 2291-92.
68. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 960-9675 (1988 & Supp.

V 1993)).
69. See generally Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1459 (1986) (discussing history of hazardous waste control and issues under CERCLA).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
71. Id.
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